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admitted, are philosophers guilty of arguing and seeking reasons in regard to God? Certainly not. Kant demonstrated once and for all that the search for argumentation in the metaphysical domain is unavoidable, for it reveals the very structure of pure reason.
But how is it possible to advance beyond classical metaphysics? Is a discourse on the possible opening up new horizons? Is the possible doing justice to God? My first reply will be negative: the possible as a philosophical category cannot do justice to God. Does it completely preclude the possibility of the impossible, this new kind of possibility which Kearney suggests? I shall eventually answer maybe-how could I be expected to exclude any kind of possibility?-provided certain methodological precautions are taken.
The Possible as a Philosophical Category
As the first category of modality, the possible is defined by Kant as "that which is in accordance with the formal conditions of experience."
2 These formal conditions of experience being given by space and time, it is impossible that I suddenly become a pure spirit or an angel, or that I have an unchanging intuition of eternal presence. I can move from one place to another, but I cannot be everywhere at the same moment. On the contrary, God, who is not submitted to the formal conditions of experience, is not potentially here or there, now and then; he is potentially and actually everywhere at once and the same time. The possible, thought as deprivation, a lack of form, or potentiality, is not in conformity with the notion of the supreme being. Kearney is right in stressing that the God of metaphysics is a pure actuality, purus actus essendi (a pure act of Being), as Thomas Aquinas puts it. As such, we agree that the possible cannot do justice to God, neither from the viewpoint of classical metaphysics, nor if it remains within the framework of the (metaphysical) first category of modality. Now one might argue that, for the very same reason, actuality as a category should not benefit from a privilege to characterize God's supreme nature. If God is simply actual, would he be deprived of possibility and of necessity? Would he be limited to the self-offering of his very presence and to an ontologically static sovereignty? Is actuality rich enough to express God's infinity and transcendence? By criticizing the onto-theological conception of God, Kearney picks up on the same kind of objection against the exclusion of other qualifications
